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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
October 9, 1981 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 81-184
UNITED STATES
(intervenor in Bankruptcy Court)
v.

SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BANK,et al.
(secured creditors)
1. SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

The question presented is whether a provision

of the new Bankruptcy Act--allowing a debtor to keep some household
goods, some other personal items, and some tools of his trade--

I'-"

2.
o~erates

to deprive secured creditors whose interest predates the

Act of their property without due process of ' law.
2.

FACTS AND DECISION BELOW:

enacted in 1978.

In a provision applicable in personal bankruptcy,
~

Bankruptcy Act §522(d) (3), (4), (6),
(4), (6),

&

(9)

The new bankruptcy law was

&

(9), 11

a

u.s.c. §522(d) (3),

(Supp. III) the Act exempts (and thereby allows the

debtor to keep) the following items from the "bankrupt estate":

.,.

-w-

(1)

;

household goods, furnishings, appliances, books, animals, crops, and
musical instruments held primarily for the personal, family or
household use of the debtor or his dependent (a maximum of $200 per
item is exempted):

(2) jewelry held primarily for personal, family,

or household use of the debtor or his dependent (a maximum of $500
total is exempted):

(3) any implements, professional books, or

tools of the debtor's trade or the trade of his dependent (a maximum
of $750 is exempted):

and (4) professionally prescribed health aids

for the debtor or his dependent.
This case involves seven different suits brought in four
bankruptcy courts and consolidated on appeal to the CAlO.

In each

case, a creditor acquired a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money

~~
~

security interest in the debtor's household funishings and ~-~
appliances before the President signed the new Bankruptcy

law.

Ac~~

In each case, the debtor instituted a bankruptcy proceeding

after Oct. 1, 1979, the :;fective date of the Act, and claimed
exemptions for the items under §522(d).

been taken without due process.

~

In each case, the creditors

objected to the exemptions on the ground that their property had

~

3.

Pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

§2403(a), the United States was

notified that the constitutionality of a federal statute had been
drawn into question, and the United States intervened in each
bankruptcy court to defend the constitutionality of the statute.
each case, the

~a~rupcy

court ruled against the

The CAlO affirmed.

d~tor.

was~nconstitutional

Bank v. Radford,--295

u.s.

cA ID

The court held that Congress intended

the Bankruptcy Act to apply retrospectively and that such
application

In

~

~

~~d{cJ

under Louisville Joint Stock Land

555 (1935).

The court did not

explici?fy~~

~~

state which clause of the fifth amendment was violated, though it

did note that the statute effected a "complete taking of the secure~
creditors' property interests" in these cases.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

,...-::::?

The SG argues that the question

presented in this appeal is substantial. He reports that the
'
'
section's constitutionality has been at issue "in a flood of
litigation."

Of the seven cases filed initially in four bankruptcy

courts and consolidated in the CAlO proceeding, three courts held
(in five cases) that the Act was unconstitutional as applied to preenactment security interests and one court held (in two cases) that
the statute should be construed as applying only prospectively so as
to avoid constitutional problems.

In addition, the SG cites 15

bankruptcy courts that have held the statute constitutional as
applied to pre-enactment security interests and 7 other courts that
have held it unconstitutional.

Another four have avoided the

constitutional issue by holding that Congress did not intend
retroactive application.

Although no other CA has, as yet, ruled on

the issue, the CA7 heard argument in a case raising the same issue

4.

on Sept. 21, 1981, and the CA4 is scheduled to hear argument in such
a case on Oct. 5.
The SG also argues that the CAlO took too narrow a view of
Congress' power to regulate bankruptcy in overruling retrospective
application of the statute in the case at bar.

He is, however,

unable to cite any case upholding a similar interference with
secured creditors' rights.
The courts holding the statute unconstitutional have relied
heavily onVZouisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935), which
held unconstitutional a provision enacted in 1934

limiting a

mortgagee's ability to perfect, after default, his interest in farms
mortgaged to him prior to default.

The SG tries to limit Radford

its facts by interpreting it as simply a holding that, in that
instance, Congress went too far.
4.
substantial.

DISCUSSION:

The question presented appears to be

In Radford, the Court held that the fifth amendment ~~

applies to bankruptcy statutes and that Congress can not take a

~

h!J~·

specific piece of property from one person and give it to another. ~~~
R dford can be distinguished on the ground that it involved a
secured interest in a specific piece of land rather than a floating

-

lien (household goods, for example, may come and go under the
n onpossessory, non-purchase money interest present in the case at
bar) over certain categories of personal possessions.

That

dif! eren~e ~~s, however, rather technical, and the effect of the

~

recent act is not unlike the act challenged in Radford.
I recommend a note of probable jurisdiction.
opposition.

There is no

5.
09/22/81
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January 8, 1982 Conference
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(

Motion of Solicitor General
to Defer Brleflng and Oral '
ArgumE:mt

No. 81-184
UNITED "STATES

v.
SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BANK, et al.
SUMt1ARY:

CA 10

After probable jurisdiction was noted in this case

the SG as appellant discovered legislation pending in Congress that
would, if enacted, render this case moot.

He now moves to defer

briefing and oral argument in the belief that final action on the
bill will be taken in the spring.

An opposition to the motion has

been filed by one of the appellees.
FACTS AND CONTENTIONS:

The Court noted probable jurisdiction

in this case on December 14, 1981 to determine whether §522(f) (2)
of the Bankruptcy Code violates the Fifth Amendment ·a s applied to
(

certain security
~

Zl~·

inte~ests

acquired before enactment of that section.

~ CtUJ/L. ~ ~ ~

fo~~~~·

~

-

2 -

The SG advises that . subsequent to the NPJ, he discovered that
H.R. 4786 had been introduced in the House of Representatives on
October 20, 1981.

He submits that among the amendments to the

Bankruptcy Code that the bill would effect is the repeal of that
portion of §522(f) (2) which is at issue in these proceedings.

!/

As such, he argues that the case would become moot if the bill is
enacted .

He adds that there is a substantial possibility that

final action on the bill may be taken this spring.
OPPOSITION:

Beneficial Finance of Kansas , one of the appellees,

opposes the SG's motion contending:

(1) that passage of the bill

is by no means certain because it is controversial and still in an
early stage of the legislative process;

(2) that even assuming

passage, there is no reason to believe enactment would take place

(

prior to the end of this Term;

(3) that the specific amendment at

issue here may not survive the legislative process;

(4} that the

case will not be rendered moot because the proposed legislation
does not purport to be retroactive; and (5) that the constitutionality
of retroactive invalidation of judicial liens will remain to be
litigated even if the proposed legislation invalidates judicial
liens which attached prior to enactment of §522(f) (2).
Further, Beneficial submits that this case should proceed to
resolution since its underlying issue, i.e., constitutionality of
provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, is currently proceeding
!/Section 8(c) of the bill provides:
Section 522(f) of title
Code, is amended by striking
all that follows through the
ing in lieu. thereof "lien is

/

(

11, United States
out "lien is" and
period and inserta judicial lien ."

•'·,

'•

,.

•

.

,,

-

3 -

t oward r es olution in two ot h e r cases where probable jurisdict ion

2/
was n oted . DIS CU SSION :

F i r s t , Be ne fici al ' s cl aim th at t his case i s

s ubs t ant i ally similar to No . 81-1 5 0 and No. 81-5 46 seems be li e d ·
by the fact that on December 14, 1 981 , the Court denied Beneficial ' s
motion to consolidate with those two appeals .
Secondly, it does appear that the proposed legislation goes
t o the heart of the issue prese n ted in this appeal .

Caution ~1d

judicial ec onomy wo uld see m to dictate that the Court awa it fin a l
action on the bill, assuming "normal" legislative progress.
A CFR from the rema ining parties might be helpful

(with a view

toward a grant) .

1/6/82

(

Caldwell

PJC

~Beneficial observes that probable jurisdiction was noted
in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Ma rathon Pipel i ne Co.,
No. 81-150, and United States v. Marathon Pipeline Co., No. 81-546.
These cases appealed from a judgment holding that the Bankruptcy
Reform Act unconstitutionally grants "extended jurisdiction" to
non-Article III ban kruptcy judges.
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February 26, 1982 Conference
List 3, Sheet 5
No. 81-184

Motion to Dispense with
Printing Joint Appendix

UNITED STATES

(

v.
SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BANK, et al.
~~:

The SG, on behalf of the appellant (United States) and with

consent of the appellees, seeks leave to dispense with filing a joint
appendix.

Probable jurisdiction was noted on December 7, 1981.

P-lSCQ§§lQN:

This case addresses the constitutionality of §522(f)(2) of

the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as applied to
before'the Act. The SG ~ates that the issue is
that the parties do not intend to rely on any matters not already printed in
the appendix to the petn. Because the issue is apparently a legal one and any

--------------~'necesary
reference materials are already before the Court, the motion should
be granted.
There is no response.
(

2/24/82
PJC

Schlueter

D

I

April 16, 1982 Conference
List 5 , Sheet 2
No. 81-184

Motion of Appellee Beneficial
Finance of Kansas, Inc. to Schedule
Oral Argument During April, 1982
Session

UNITED STATES (Intervenor
in Bankruptcy Court)

(
.._./

v.
SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BANK,
et al. (Secured Creditors)
SUMMARY :

Noting that only the SG ' s reply brief remains to be filed ,

resps move to schedule oral argument during the April session and dispose of
this case in the 1982 Term.

This case involves the question of whether the

new Bankruptcy Act deprives secured creditors (such as resps) of due process

~------~~~--------

by permitting debtors to retain various goods and property.
CONTENTIONS :

Resps argue that:

( 1)

Because of the diminishing value of

the secured interests in this case, time works to the detriment of the resps
who are being deprived of their right to the property .

(2)

Severe injustice

will fall on those creditors who must await final resolution of this case; the
importance of prompt disposition is demonstrated by the accelerated handling
by the lower courts .

(3)

Resps have raised the question of the

•,

..

- 2 -

unconstitutionality of the Bankruptcy Act--an issue also presented in the
Northern Pipeline cases now set for argument on April 27.

The relationship of

these cases thus counsels joint consideration.
DISCUSSION:

Although disposition of the Northern Pipeline cases may have
'

. some impact on this case, resps have not demonstrated any compelling reasons
for accelerating oral arguments at this late date.
Therefore, the motion should be denied.
There is no response.
4/14/82
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~

I
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United States v. Security Industrial Bank
September 29, 1982

Michael F. Sturley

Questions Presented
(1) Does Bankruptcy Code §522 (f) (2), which allows an
individual debtor to avoid certain nonpossessory, nonpurchasemoney security interests, apply retroactively?
(2) If so, does retroactive application violate the
Fifth Amendment?
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v. Security Industrial Bank

Background

The Statute
Under the rationale that bankruptcy should provide debt-

ors with a "fresh start," §522 of the new Bankruptcy Code (the
"Code") governs exemptions.

Subsection (b) allows an individual

debtor to exempt certain property from his estate, including the
property specified in subsection (d)
rejects this federal list).

(unless state law explicitly

Subsection (d) (3), for example, in-

eludes household furnishings and appliances valued at less than
$200 each.

Under subsection (c), exempt property generally is

not subject to creditors' claims.

---

To prevent circumvention of

§522, subsection (e) invalidates waivers of exemptions.

----------------------------

ly, subsection (f) governs certain security interests:

""

Similar-

,.

.

~

~

Not~itbstanding an~ waiver of exemptions, the
~
debtor ~id the fixing of a lien on an interest of
the debtor in property to the extent that such lien
impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have
been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if
such lien is--

* * *
(2) a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any-(A) household furnishings, household
goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books,
animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor or
a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or
tools, of the trade or the debtor or the
trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally prescribed health
aids for the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor.
11

u.s.c.

§522(f)

(Supp. IV).

Under the previous Bankruptcy Act
/

-----.......

(the "Bankruptcy Act"), exemptions were governed principally by
state law.

11

u.s.c.

§24 (1976).

bench memo:
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Security Industrial Bark

Facts
Before the passage of the Code, various individuals (the

"Debtors"), nominal appellees here, granted nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money security interests in their household furnishings and appliances to ap'ees banks and finance companies (the
"Creditors").

After the effective date of the Code, the Debtors

instituted bankruptcy proceedings, claiming exemptions under §522
for items that were subject to the Creditors' security interests.

c.

Decisions Below
Each Debtor filed a complaint in bankruptcy court to

avoid the Creditor's lien under §522(f) (2).

Each Creditor moved

to dismiss the complaint, arguing that application of §522(f) (2)
to a security interest acquired before passage of the Code violated the Fifth Amendment.

The United States intervened in each

case to defend the constitutionality of the provision.
In two cases, the bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Congress had not intended §522(f) (2) to
apply retroactively.

In five cases, the bankruptcy court held

that Congress had intended retroactive application, but nevertheless dismissed the complaint on the ground that §522(f) (2), as
thus applied, violated the Fifth Amendment.
The seven cases were consolidated for appeal.

CAlO de-

-------------~'-~
cided that Congress
had intended §522(f) (2) ~
to apply
retroactive-

ly, but relying on Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford,
295

u.s.

555 (1935), it held that this application of §522 (f) (2)

violated the Fifth Amendment.

bench memo: u.s .. v. Security Industrial Bar'lk

II.

page 4.

Discussion

As a logical matter, the first question to arise is the
proper construction of §522.

In the present case, however, the

proper construction of the section depends in large measure on
the constitutionality of its retroactive application.

I will

begin, therefore, with a discussion of the constitutional implications of retroactivity, and then discuss whether this is what
Congress intended.

A.

The Legal Rights Involved
There is considerable confusion about the legal status

of a creditor with a nonpossessory security interest.

Some is

evident in the parties' briefs; greater confusion may be found in
various lower court opinions addressing this issue, and in the
secondary literature commenting on those cases.

To clarify the

subsequent discussion, I begin with a brief summary of my analysis of the legal rights involved.

~~~~i;hts

are d:::;;ined by

~state.
~~hed
_,.~They

and could vary from state to

The governing principles, however, are either well estabby common law, or codified

should

~ ~'-'

~redito

the debtor will owe money to the

and the debt will be secured by a "security interest"

~v:~~pecific,
~

stat;~law,

Strictly speaking, these

identified collateral, which may or may not be worth

more than the debt.

The creditor has both a contract interest

and a property interest.

His contract interest, which is inde-

pendent of the security, is in the debtor's obligation to repay

bench memo: u.S - v. Security Industrial Ba · ,,

the debt.

page 5.

If the collateral is destroyed, for example, the obli-

gation to repay the debt will remain.

Or if the security inter-

est is worth less than the debt, the creditor has the right to a
deficiency judgment.
The "security interest" itself is a property interest in
-------------~--------the collateral, which generally may be enforced against third

--

parties.

The creditor does not have a fee simple absolute in

possession, of course, but he does have a "bundle of rights" over
the collateral.

The precise nature of the various rights in the

bundle is not important for present purposes, but one will be the
right to recover the debt from the proceeds of the sale of collateral under certain circumstances.
Although they may seem obvious, three errors are responsible for much of the misanalysis that has taken place on this
issue.

It is a mistake to speak of the Creditors' obtaining the

rights of unsecured creditors in substitution of their rights as
secured creditors.

This is not a substitution, for they already

have the rights of unsecured creditors under the Debtors' independent contractual obligation to repay the debt.

(In a nonre-

course situation, a secured creditor would lack the rights of an
unsecured creditor.)

It is also a mistake to confuse the value

of the property interest with the value of the contract interest.
The former is limited by the latter, but if the debt is worth
more than the collateral, the property interest is limited to the
value of the collateral.

Finally, it is a mistake to think of

the Creditors' property interests as an all-or-nothing proposi-

tion.

They have a bundle of rights, and it is possible for some

to be lost while others are retained.

B.

Constitutionality under the Takings Clause
The SG argues at length that §522 is a reasonable exer-

cise of Congress's bankruptcy power.

This may be true, but it is

a separate question whether an otherwise valid regulation operates as a taking of property requiring compensation.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458

See, e.g.,

u.s.

__, __,

102 S.Ct. 3164, 3171 (1982); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260

u.s.

393, 415 (1922).

It is undisputed that the "bankruptcy pow-

er, like the other great substantive powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment."
~

v. Radford, 295

u.s.

Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank

555, 589 (1935).

~

(1) Radford and its Continued Validity.

Radford~~

which CAlO relied, is the case most directly on point.

There the

Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Brandeis, considered the
~~

constitutionality of the Frazier-Lemke Act, which limited a mortgagee's power to foreclose a mortgage on certain farms.

~Court

The

specifically identified five rights--five strands in the

bundle of rights constituting the property interest--that the Act
denied the mortgagee.

Id., at 594-95.

But the Act did not de-

stroy the mortgagee's property interest entirely.

Its effect was

~either)postpone the interest by five years, or permit the
mortgagor to defeat the interest upon payment of what amounted to
roughly three-quarters of the farm's appraised value.

See id.,

bench memo:
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Security Industrial Bank
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The Court, finding "that the taking of [the

five] rights from the mortgagee effects a substantial impairment
of the security," id., at 595, held that the Act "has taken from
the [mortgagee] without compensation, and given to [the mortgagor], rights in specific property which are of substantial value,"
id., at 601.
The Frazier-Lemke Act was amended by Congress, and rev"'"

turned to haunt the Court for several years.

In Wright v. Vinton

Branch of the Mountain Trust Bank of Roanoke, 300

u.s.

440

(1937), the Court, in another unanimous opinion by Justice Brandeis, upheld the constitutionality of the amended Act.
~

This time

the Court found that Congress had undeniably preserved three of
the rights that the original Act had taken.

Id., at 458.

And

Congress sought to preserve all of the mortgagee's rights "so far
as essential to the enjoyment of his security."

Id., at 457.

The Vinton Branch opinion is somewhat confusing, since
it speaks of deprivation of property without due process rather
than taking of property without compensation, even when discussing Radford.

Since Radford was only two years old at the time, I

find it difficult to believe that the Court intended to retreat
from its earlier analysis without comment.
confusio~

as follows:

I would explain the

In Radford, the deprivation of rights was

sufficient to constitute a taking.

Since there was no compensa-

tion, the Act failed under the Takings Clause.

A taking without

compensation, however, is also a violation of due process, for
when the deprivation constitutes a taking, the Constitution specifies that due process requires compensation.

In Vinton Branch,
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on the other hand, the deprivation was not su f ficient to constitute a taking.

It was therefore necessary to continue the analy-

sis, and decide if the deprivation was nevertheless without due
process.

The amended Act survived this challenge, too.

Vinton

Branch does not deny that some impairments of liens will be serious enough to constitute a taking.
Two subsequent cases support the view that Radford's
analysis has not been rejected.
Insurance

In Wright v. Union Central Life

------------------Co., 311 u.s. 273 (1940),

the support is weak dicta.

The Court was again construing the amended Frazier-Lemke Act.
(~

This time it held that the mortgagor had the right, under the
Act, to redeem his farm at its

-

apprais~d

value.

Although the

mortgagee loses his right to a public sale, he is still protected
to the extent of the value of the property.

The Court noted that

this was the extent of his constitutional protection.
278-79.

Id., at

The Act was constitutional because there was not a sub-

stantial impairment of the security, such as had been found in
Radford.

v

In Armstrong v. United States, 364

is stronger support for Radford.

u.s.

40 (1960), there

There the government's acquisi-

tion of ten ships under construction operated to make certain
materialmen's liens unenforceable.

The Court held that "[t]he

total destruction by the Government of all value of these liens,
which constitute compensable property, has every possible element
of a Fifth Amendment 'taking'."

Id., at 48.

The SG argues that the "Court quickly retreated from the
broad implications of the Radford decision."

SG's Brief, at 28.

He points to Vinton Branch as an example of the retreat, but, as
noted above, I am unconvinced by this interpretation.

At most

there was a retreat on the question of whether the specific deprivation effected by the Frazier-Lemke Act was a "taking," but
even this is doubtful.

The original and amended versions were

simply placed on different sides of the "taking" line.
points to Union Central.

He also

Since Union Central protected the mort-

gagee's essential right to the value of the lien, however, any
erosion is not enough to help the SG here.
a footnote in Helvering v. Griffiths, 318

Finally, the SG cites

u.s.

371, 400-01 n.52

(1943), as a "candi[d] acknowledge[ment] that [in Radford and
Vinton Branch] the Court fell into error and was required by Congress to re-examine an earlier decision."

SG's Brief, at 29.

But in fact the footnote is merely given as an example of a case
where Congress has been willing to enact laws that may requi:;~~

~~

the Court to reexamine earlier decisions.
I feel confident that the Court has not yet

undercut ~·

Radford, at least not to the extent claimed by the SG.
relies on it heavily in Armstrong, 364
~~

u.s.,

at 44.

The Court

(The SG does

not even mention Armstrong in the section of his brief discussed

~~

last paragraph.)

In the Iranian claims case, you cited

Armstrong and Radford for the "settled" principle "that an attachment entitling a creditor to resort to specific property for
the satisfaction of a claim is a property right compensable under
the Fifth Amendment."
n.l (1981)

Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453

(opinion of POWELL, J., concurring}.

u.s.

I think

Court is justified in continuing to rely on Radford.

654, 690
the

~ Gf4~
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Assuming that Radford

retains its vitality, the next step is to determine if it applies
here.

Certainly the basic facts are essentially the same: Con-

gress has passed a law under its bankruptcy power that deprives a
secured creditor of a property right in a lien.

The SG suggests

several distinctions, however, so I will examine these in turn.
First, the Frazier-Lemke Act at issue in Radford was not
an ordinary bankruptcy law, since it did not dischare any obligations and did not apply prospectively.

The SG seems to be hint-

ing that the Act failed in a balancing process because there was
not a sufficient public interest.

But the Radford Court explic-

itly stated that it did not decide whether the statute was within
Congress's bankruptcy power.

It assumed that it was, and then

applied a strict property analysis.

~~his

u.s.,

at 589, 598-602.

Second, the mortgage in Radford covered real property.
distinction must fail, for the lien in Armstrong covered

~~onal
~e~s.
~~en

295

property.

Furthermore, such a distinction would be dan-

Although real property was the primary form of wealth

the Takings Clause was adopted, and continues to occupy a

~.f

~~privileged place in Takings Clause doctrine, see, e.g., Loretto,
~-

·

supra; Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), its
place in society has generally been replaced by personal property.

p~~.vz_~~~
~ ~~~-~~.~l-4t IJJ..
Third, the SG argues that the property interests at is-

sue here are insubstantial, since they are generally worth much
less than the debt and the Creditors do not wish to obtain possession of the collateral.

"

..

~ ~.r

To begin with, there is no support in

f
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the record for the view that the liens are de minimis.

On the

contrary, the parties in Rodrock, one of the cases below, stipulated that the collateral consisted of 15 items (including a sewing machine and a color television) worth $580.
at 17a n.2.

In Knezel, the total value was $540.

amount of the debt is not clear in either case.)

Juris stmt app,
Ibid.

(The

There is no

theoretical limit on the size of the lien, for §522(d) (3) places
only a $200 per item limitation on the exemption.
items could support a $20,000 lien.

A hundred

And the fact that the Credi-

tors would prefer repayment of the debt to repossession of the
collateral is not a significant distinction.

It is true of al-

most every secured creditor.
More importantly, the SG's argument misconstrues the
relevant substantiality.

In determining whether a particular

deprivation of property rights is sufficient to constitute a
"taking," the Court will often look at the extent to which the
government's action deprives the person of his property rights.
In the terms of the familiar analogy, it will decide how many
strands are taken from the bundle of rights, and whether this
action destroys the value of the bundle.

The Court does not rely

on the total length of the bundle, nor even the length of the
strands taken.

It is worse for the government to take a person's

entire interest in a small amount of property, e.g., Armstrong,
than to take only a portion of a person's interest in very valuable property, e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438

u.s.

104 (1978), even though the former is far less

valuable in absolute terms.

See also Loretto, supra, 458

u.s.,
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at _ _ , 102 S.Ct., at 3176 ("Such an appropriation is perhaps the
most serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests ....

[T]he government does not simply take a single 'strand'

from the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.")
Fourth, the SG argues that the liens are not interests
in "specific property," but blanket liens covering all of a debtors household goods.
of the case.

This argument is not supported by the facts

In at least two of the cases below, it appears that

the liens are on specific items of property that were identified
at the time of the security agreement.

Furthermore, blanket

liens are recognized as valid property interests under the Uniform Commercial Code.

In any event, it would be unworkable to

hold §522(f) constitutional when applied only to blanket liens.
Fifth, the SG argues that §522 does not destroy all
nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests, since it
does not take effect except in bankruptcy, and does not impair
liens on nonexempt property.

While this argument may be relevant

in determining the reasonableness of the statute, it is irrelevant in the Takings Clause context.

The government cannot defend

one taking on the ground that it did not take other property,
too.

The Act in Radford did not destroy all farm mortgages.
Sixth, the SG argues that the Creditors do not have

strong, legitimate interests in the liens that are destroyed by
§522.

This argument is based in part on the assumption that they

should have known that the Bankruptcy Act was about to be amended, and in part on the Congressional finding that these liens are

• ;t.
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often unconscionably obtained by overreaching creditors.
notice argument is frivolous.

The Creditors were entitled to

rely on the well-established law upholding the rights of secured
creditors, even in bankruptcy.
Trust Co., 299
{1886).

u.s.

See, e.g., Kuehner v. Irving

445 {1937); Long v. Bullard, 117

u.s.

617

The fairness argument is not supported by any evidence

in the present case.

To the extent it is true in the present

case, §522 is unnecessary, for the liens could be avoided under
state law.

To the extent it is generally true, it is irrelevant

in the Takings Clause context.

A strong public purpose is not

sufficient to dispense with the compensation requirement.
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260

u.s.,

Penn-

at 415.

------

In sum, I find none of the SG's supposed distinctions
----------------------~~between Radford and the present case to be persuasive.
In fact,
the principal distinction that I see suggests that this case is
much more compelling than Radford.

The Frazier-Lemke Act de-

prived mortgagees of five strands from their bundle of rights,
but it preserved at least some {perhaps most) of the value of
their security.

Here §522 destroys the liens entirely.

The

Creditor in Rodrock loses its $580 security interest, and is left
with only its unsecured claim, which is worth $1.

The Knezel

Creditor, who loses a $540 lien, would also receive $1 as an unsecured creditor.

Section 522 thus takes a much greater share of

the Creditors' property interests than the Frazier-Lemke Act did
in Radford.

-

Unless the Court overrules {or ignores) Radford, it

practically requires affirmance here.

~-------~--------------~----------'-----

~~~

~~~~
k~

{3) The Advisability of Overruling Radford.

Even if

Radford were not directly on point, I would recommend affirming

Clause cases.

The general principles are discussed in Penn Cen-

tral, supra, where the Court identified two factors to be considered in what is essentially an ad hoc factual inquiry.

First is

the "economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations."

438

u.s.,

Second "is the character of the governmental action."

at 124.
Ibid.

The "distinct investment-backed expectations" are clear.
There was unambiguous state law allowing the Creditors to obtain
enforceable property interests.

The bankruptcy law had always

distinguished between secured and unsecured creditors, and this
Court had enforced liens in bankruptcy.

Relying on these fac-

tors, the Creditors invested money in loans to the Debtors on the
strength of the security interests at issue here.

The economic

impact of §522 is devestating, as the Creditors have lost all of

----

---------------~---~---

their security.

The case is thus much stronger than Loretto,

supra, where the government took a small slice of all the
strands, or Kaiser Aetna, supra, where the government took the
entire length of a single strand.

Here the government took the

-

entire bundle with all the strands.
I find the "character of the governmental action" factor
to be somewhat puzzling.

It does not make any difference that

the "taking" is for the benefit of the Debtors rather than for
the immediate use of the government, for "the deprivation of the

.

(

.
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former owner rather than the accretion of a right or interest to
the sovereign constitutes the taking."
Motors, 323

u.s.

373, 378 (1945).

United States v. General

The taking in Pennsylvania

Coal Co. v. Mahon was for the benefit of surface owners, the taking in Kaiser Aetna was for the benefit of Hawaiian boat owners,
and the taking in Loretto was for the benefit of a cable television company.

The governmental action here seems little differ-

ent from any of those cases.
In sum, the principles of Radford are consistent with
the Court's other Takings cases, and should not be overruled now.
It should be applied to affirm the present case.

c.

Constitutionality under the Due Process Clause

~ ~

The SG focuses his argument on the reasonableness of

~

§522, treating this case as turning on substantive due process.~
There is confusion in the lower courts on which clause of the
Fifth Amendment is applicable here, and this Court contributed to
the confusion with its change of analysis between Radford and
Vinton Branch.

In many respects, though, the due process

ment is really a straw man.

arg~-

Substantive due process has been

largely discredited, and it seems highly unlikely that the Court
would find a due process violation here in the absence of a taking of compensable property.

I mention the issue here, since it

has been the object of such attention in the case, but I do not
think that due process analysis adds much to the resolution of
the issues.

If you would like me to discuss this point in great-

er detail, however, I will be happy to do so.

~

/
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D.

The Proper Construction of §522(f) (2)
In the discussion thus far, I have assumed that §522(f)

should be construed to apply retroactively.

On that construe-

tion, I would recommend holding that the section violates the
Takings Clause.

The Court need not reach this constitutional

iss~how~,

if §522(f) is construed to apply only to liens

--

-----

created after the enactment of the Code in November 1978.

CAlO construed §522(f) to have retroactive effect, and
in the absence of constitutional difficulties, this view has much
to recommend it.

Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-

598, §402(a), 92 Stat. 2549, 2682, stated that the Code "shall
take effect on October 1, 1979" except as otherwise provided.
The savings provisions, Reform Act §403, provide that cases commenced before the effective date shall continue to be governed by
the Bankruptcy Act rather than the Code.

It should have been

clear to Congress that cases commenced shortly after the effective date might involve rights vested before the enactment date,
less than a year before.

But there is no explicit provision ex-

cepting §522 (f).
On the other hand, there is a colorable argument that
Congress did not intend retroactive application of §522(f), at
---------------~

~

~

least to the extent that it would create constitutional questions.

Early drafts of the savings provisions would have explic-

itly required retroactive application in cases such as this, but

---------------------------------------

one of the witnesses testifying before Congress suggested that
there were constitutional difficulties with the approach.
draft provision was eliminated.

The

As the SG correctly notes, the
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witness was one of many, and there were numerous drafting
changes.

It is not clear whether Congress focused on the wit-

ness's statement, or if the change was made in response to it.
But it is at least a colorable argument, and accepting it would
allow the Court to avoid the constitutional issue.
In addition to the straightforward language of the Reform Act, there are two other arguments for the proposition that
Congress intended retroactive application.
ling.

Neither is compel-

First, the SG contends that denying retroactive applica-

tion "would have postponed for many years a reform long overdue."
SG's Brief, at 9.

The arguments in support of this contention,

however, relate solely to the need for the reform.
25.

Id., at 24-

There is nothing to suggest that the reform would be signif-

icantly delayed if §522(f) applied only prospectively.

We do not

have copies of the actual contracts at issue here, but apparently
they are typically of limited duration.
_ _, _ _ n. 7 (CA7 1982)
month contract).

(en bane)

In re Gifford,

(Pell, J., dissenting)

F. 2d
(36

Since long-term debt is not secured by these

types of liens, most liens created before November 1978 have already expired by their terms.

The one exception would be if the

same security agreement were used to secure additional extensions
of credit, but these new extensions would create new rights that
would be subject to §522 in any event.
7

Second, CAlO noted that Reform Act §40l(a) repealed the
Bankruptcy Act.

Thus if §522 does not have retroactive effect,

there is a "statutory gap."

Juris stmt app, at Sa.

ment fails for several reasons.

~·

This argu-

CAlO overlooked the fact that

.
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~-w-<-~

avoiding .~-

the Bankruptcy Act made no provision for exemptions, or
liens on exemptions, so its repeal is irrelevant.

Prior to

197 ~

state law governed exemptions, and there is no reason it could
not continue to do so.

Congress certainly did not see any prob-

lem with applying state law in this field, since §522(b) (1) explicitly allows state law to override the federal list of exempt ions, and § 5 22 (b) ( 2) (A) explicitly allows a debtor to claim the
benefit of state exemptions in lieu of the federal list.

(Two-

thirds of the states have opted out of the Code's exemption
list.)

Finally, there is no "gap" problem if only subsection (f)

is construed to have no retroactive effect.

The list of exempt

property would remain the same, although preexisting liens would
continue to be recognized.
The legislative history is fuzzy enough here that the
statute could be construed either way without great difficulty.
Were it not ~
f or the constitutional problems, I would recommend

----------------------------------------

construing §522(f) as having retroactive effect, but that course
does cause serious (even dispositive) constitutional problems.
"It is well settled that [the] Court will not pass on the
constitutionality of an Act of Congress if a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the construction may be
avoided."

United States v. Clark, 445

also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440

u.s.

u.s.

23, 27 (1980).

490, 500 (1979)

See

("an Act

of Congress ought not to be construed to violate the Constitution
if any other possible construction remains available").

Constru-

ing §522(f) to have only prospective effect may not be the most
obvious construction, but it is at least "fairly · possible."

Per-
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~

haps it would be the best course to follow here.

It would effec-

tively eliminate a constitutional violation without having to
declare another portion of the Code unconstitutional.

III.

Conclusion

I recommend that the judgment below be affirmed.

Sec-

tion 522(f) operates to deprive the Creditors of their entire
property interest in the liens without compensation.
violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.

This is a
Radford is

directly on point, and is consistent with the Court's more recent
Takings cases.

It may be preferable, however, to construe

§522(f) as having only prospective effect, and thus avoid reaching this constitutional issue.

Such a construction is not the

most obvious interpretation of the statute, but it is not unreasonable.
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SUPREME COURT OF TilE UNITED STATES
No. 81-184
UNITED STATES, APPELLANT v. SECURITY
INDUSTRIAL BANK ET AL.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
[October - , 1982]

JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the effect of 11 U. S. C. § 522(f)(2),
which permits individual debtors in bankruptcy proceedings
to avoid liens on certain property. The Court of Appeals
consolidated seven appeals from the Bankruptcy Courts for
the Districts of Kansas and Colorado. In each case the
debtor was an individual who instituted bankruptcy proceedings after the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
·95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 ("the Act"), became effective on October 1, 1979. In each case one of the appellees had loaned the
debtor money and obtained and perfected a lien on the debtor's household furnishings and appliances before the Act was
enacted on November 6, 1978. None of these liens were pos. sessory, and none secured purchase-money obligations.
Included within the personal property subject to the appellees' liens were household items which are exempt from the
property included within the debtors' estates by virtue of
subsections (b) and (d) of§ 522. 1 The debtors claimed these
The exemptions were designed to permit individual debtors to retain
exempt property so that they will be able to enjoy a "fresh start" after
bankruptcy.
Subsections (b) and (d) of § 522 provide in pertinent part:
(b) [A]n individual debtor may exempt from the property of the estate
1

,,
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exemptions in their respective bankruptcy proceedings, relying on § 522(f)(2) to avoid the liens. That section provides:
"Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the
debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien on an interest of the
debtor in property to the extent such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled
under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is(2) a nonposessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in any- ·
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing
apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry that are held primarily for the
personal, family, or household use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools, of the
trade of the debtor or of a dependent of the debtor; or
(C) professionally presecribed health aids for the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor."
The appellees asserted that application of § 522(f)(2) to
liens acquired before the enactment date would violate the
... (1) property that is specified under subsection (d) of this section.
(d) The following property may be exempted under subsection (b)(1) of
this section:
(3) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $200 in value in any perticular
item, in household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, or musical instruments, that are held primarily for the personal, family or household use of the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor.
(4) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $500 in value, in jewelry held primarily for the personal, family, or household use of the debtor
.or the dependent of the debtor.
(6) The debtor's aggregate interest, not to exceed $750 in value, in any
implements, professional books, or tools, of the trade of the debtor or the
trade of a dependent of the debtor.
(9) Professionally described health aids for the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor.

81-184-0PINION
UNITED STATES v. SECURITY INDUSTRIAL BANK

3

Fifth Amendment. The United States intervened in each
case to defend the constitutionality of the federal statute, 2
but the bankruptcy courts in each case refused to apply
§ 522(f)(2) to abrogate liens acquired before the enactment
date. 3
~
The Court of Appeals consolidated the cases and affirmed
the jud~nkruptcy courts. ' 642 F. 2d 1195
(CAlO 1981). It held that the Act was intended to apply
retrospectively, and thus was designed to invalidate liens acquired before the enactment date. It also held, however,
that such an application violates the Fifth Amendment. The
court stated that § 522(f)(2) effects a "complete taking of the
secured creditors' property interest," and is thus invalid
under Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295
U. S. 555 (1935). The United States appealed, and we noted
probable jurisdiction. - - U. S. - - (1982).
The appellees, of course, defend the judgment of the Court
of Appeals. 4 The government argues at some length that
' See 28 U. S. C. § 2403(a).
3
In Schulte v. Beneficial Finance of Kansas, Inc., No. 79-11718, and
Hunter v. Beneficial Finance of Kansas, Inc., No. 79-11745, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas noted that retrospective application
of § 522(f)(2) creates constitutional problems and held that it should be applied only prospectively. In Jackson v. Security Industrial Bank, No. 80
C 1078, Stevens v. Liberty Loan Corp., No. 80 Me 0056, Rodrock v. Security Industrial Bank, No. 80 M 0014, and Knezel v. Security Industrial
Bank, No. 80 M 0224, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado
concluded that § 522(f)(2), as applied retrospectively, violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Hoops v. Freedom Finance,
No. 80 K 0294, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado concluded that§ 522(f)(2), as applied retrospectively, violates "substantive due
. process."
'Appellee Beneficial Finance of Kansas, Inc. asserts that the judgments
should be affirmed because the Act violates Article III of the Constitution
by granting judicial power to non-Article III bankruptcy judges. See
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., U. S . - (1982) (plurality opinion); id., a t - (REHNQUIST, J., concurring in the judgment). Since we affirm the judgment of the Court of Ap-
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retrospective application of § 522(f)(2) to these liens would
not violate the Fifth Amendment. It contends that the enactment is a "rational" exercise of Congress' bankruptcy
power, that for "bankruptcy purposes" property interests are
all but indistinguishable from contractual interests, that
these particular interests were "insubstantial" and therefore
their destruction does not amount to a "taking" of property
requiring compensation. We do not decide the constitutional
question reached by the Court of Appeals. We address it
only to determine whether the attack on the retrospective
application of the statute raises substantial enough constitutional doubts to warrant the employment of the canon of statutory construction referred to post, 8--10.
It may be readily agreed that § 522(f)(2) is a rational exercise of Congress' authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause
4, and that this authority has been regularly construed to authorize the retrospective impairment of contractual obligations. Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181,
188 (1902). Such agreement does not, however, obviate the
additional difficulty that arises when that power is sought to
be used to defeat traditional property interests. The bankruptcy power is subject to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition
against taking private property without compensation.
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555
(1935). Thus, however "rational" the exercise of the bankruptcy power may be, that inquiry is quite separate from the
question whether the enactment takes property within the
· prohibition of the Fifth Amendment.
The government apparently contends (Brief for the United
States, at 30-32) that because cases such as Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U. S.
254 (1970) defined "property" for purposes of the Due Process Clause sufficiently broadly to include rights which at common law would have been deemed contractual, traditional
peals on other grounds, we find it unnecessary to consider this contention.
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property rights are entitled to no greater protection under
the takings clause than traditional contract rights. It argues
that "bankruptcy principles do not support a sharp distinction
between the rights of secured and unsecured creditors."
Brief for the United States, at 31. However "bankruptcy
principles" may speak to this question, our cases recognize,
as did the common law, that the contractual right of a secured
creditor to obtain repayment of his debt may be quite different in legal contemplation from the property right of the
same creditor in the collateral. Compare Hanover National
Bank v. Moyses, supra, with Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, supra, and Kaiser-Aetna v. United States,
444 u. s. 164 (1979).
Since the governmental action here would result in a complete destruction of the roperty right of the secured )arty,
the case ts ut aw war y m o the amework o analysis
employed in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 438 U. S. 194 (1978) and PruneYard Shopping Center
v. Robbins, 447 U. S. 76 (1980), where governmental action
affected some but not all of the "bundle of rights" which comprise the "property" in question. The government argues
that the interest of a secured party such as was involved here
is "insubstantial," apparently in part because it is a
nonpurchase-money, non-possessory interest in personal
property. The "bundle of rights" which accrues to a secured
party is obviously smaller than that which accrues to an
owner in fee simple, but the government cites no cases supporting the proposition that differences such as these relegate the secured party's interest to something less than property. 5 And our decisions in Radford, supra, and Armstrong
At oral argument the government conceded that the liens at issue in
this case are treated as property under state law. Tr. Oral Arg., at 21.
Both Kansas and Colorado have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code.
Although under the Code the priority among secured parties is often af) fected by the purchase money or posessory character of security interests,
•

6
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v. United States, 364 U. S. 40 (1961), militate against such a

prop;n~

In ado d we held that the Frazier-Lemke Act, June 28,
1934, c. 869, i!8 Stat. 1289, violated the takings clause. The
bank held a nonpurchase-money mortgage on Radford's farm.
Radford defaulted and instituted bankruptcy proceedings.
The Frazier-Lemke Act, which by its terms applied only
retrospectively, permitted the debtor to purchase the property at its appraised value regardless of the amount of the
mortgage. 6 We held the statute was void because it effected
a "taking of substantive rights in specific property acquired
by the Bank prior to" its enactment. 295 U. S., at 590. In
his opinion for the Court, Justice Brandeis stated:
"[T]he Fifth Amendment commands that, however
great the Nation's need, private property shall not be
thus taken even for a wholly public use without just compensation. If the public interest requires, and permits,
the taking of property of individual mortgagees in order
to relieve the necessities of individual mortgagors, resort must be had to proceedings by eminent domain; so
that, through taxation, the burden of the relief afforded
in the public interest may be borne by the public."
see, e, g. , § 9-312, these characterizations do not affect the nature of the
security interest. See§§ 9-107 (defining "purchase money security interest"), 9-305 (providing for perfection of security interests by posession).
· Section 101(28) of the Act defines a lien as a "charge against or interest
in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation."
It does not make distinctions based on the purchase-money or posessory
nature of a lien.
6
The Frazier-Lemke Act permitted the farmer, if the mortgagee assented, to purchase the property at its then appraised value, acquiring
both title and posession, on a deferred payment plan. If the mortgagee
refused to assent, the court was required to stay all proceedings for 5
years, during which time the farmer could retain posession by paying a reasonable rent. After 5 years the property could be reappraised, but the
farmer still had the right to puchase it free and clear for the appraised
value regardless of the amount of the lien. See Radford, supra, at
557-558.
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Id., at 602.
In Armstrong, materialmen delivered materials to a prime
contractor for use in constructing navy personnel boats.
Under state law, they obtained liens in the vessels. 7 The
prime contractor defaulted on his obligations to the United
States, and the government took title to and possession of the
uncompleted hulls and unused materials, thus making it impossible for the materialmen to enforce their liens. We held
that this constituted a taking:
"The total destruction by the government of all compensable value of these liens, which constitute compensable property, has every possible element of a Fifth
Amendment 'taking' and is not a mere 'consequential incidence' of a valid regulatory measure."

364 U. S., at 48.
The government seeks to distinguish Armstrong on the
ground that it was a classical "taking" in the sense that the
government acquired for itself the property in question,
while in the instant case the government has simply imposed
a general economic regulation which in effect transfers the
property interest from a private creditor to a private debtor.
While the classical taking may indeed be of the sort that the
government describes, our cases show that takings analysis
is not limited t<y<Sutright acquisitions by the government for
itself. See 'Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
~orp., U. S. - , 102 S.Ct. 3164 (Jun~, 1982);
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, supra; Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 415 (1922).
The government finally contends that because the resale
value of household goods is generally low, and because creditors therefore view the principal value of their security as a
iever to negotiate for reaffirmation of the debt rather than as
7

Under the Uniform Commercial Code definition, these statutory liens
would be nonposessory, nonpurchase-money liens in personal property.
See note 5, supra.
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a vehicle for foreclosure, the property interests involved here
do not merit protection under the takings clause. While this
contention cannot be dismissed out of hand, it seems to run
counter to the state's characterization of the interest as property, see note 5, supra, and to our reliance in other "takings"
cases on state law characterizations, see, e. g., Kaiser-Aetna
v. United States, supra, 444 U. S. 164, 179, and also to at
least some of the implications of Radford, supra, and Armstrong, supra.
The foregoing discussion satisfies us that there is substan- J
tial doubt whether the retroactive destruction of the appellees' liens in these cases comports with the Fifth Amendment. We now consider whether, as a matter of statutory
construction, § ~2(f){2) m~t nee~ be ~plied in t]'lat
manner. We consider the statutory question because of the
"'cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the constitutional question may be avoided.'"
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U. S. 575, 577 (1978), quoting Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932).
The Court of Appeals thought § 522(f)(2) must apply retroactively, that is, to liens which attached before the enactment
date because "there would be no bankruptcy law applicable
to cases involving such liens if it did not. 642 F. 2d, at 1197.
The court apparently thought that if§ 522(f)(2) does not apply
to liens which came into existence before the Act was enacted, then no part of the Act could apply to cases involving
such liens. This is not necessarily the case. The liens, of
course, exist under state law independently of the Act. Although the Act, in general, is effective for all cases commenced after its effective date, Congress might have intended that provisions which drastically affect previously
vested property rights apply only to interests which came
into effect after the Act was enacted. If § 522(f)(2) is such a
provision, the remainder of the Act would not affect the
enforceability of these liens, but would still apply to these

r-
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liens and these cases. We think that the analysis of the
Court of Appeals did not adequately dispose of the question
as to the retrospective effect of § 522(f), and we therefore
pursue the inquiry further.
The principle that statutes operate only prospectively,
while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to
every law student. Compare Sands, Sutherland's Statutory
Construction § 106 with Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618,
622--625 (1965). This Court has often pointed out that

J

the first rule of construction is that legislation must be
considered as addressed to the future, not to the
past. . . . The rule has been expressed in varying degrees of strength but always of one import, that a retrospective operation will not be given to a statute which
interferes with antecedent rights ... unless such be "the
unequivocal and inflexible import of the terms, and the
manifest intention of the legislature."
Union Pacific R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U. S.
190, 199 (1913) (citations omitted). See e. g., United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U. S.
306, 314 (1908) ("The presumption is very strong that a statute was not meant to act retrospectively, and it ought never
to receive such a construction if it is subceptible of any
o~her."); United States v·. The Peggy, 5 U. S. (1 Cranch) 103,
110 (1801).
This principle has been repeatedly applied to bankruptcy
statutes affecting property rights. In Holt v. Henley, 232
U. S. 637 (1914), the Court had before it a new statute granting bankruptcy trustees the position of a lienholder with priority over sellers on conditional sales contracts. Act of June
25, 1910, c, 412, § 8, 26 Stat. 838, 840. This provision, like
§ 522(f)(2), could be read literally to divest property interests
which had been created before it was enacted. The 1910

---

-- ·- ---
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statute, like the Act, applied to all bankruptcy cases instituted after it became effective. 8 Nonetheless, the Court followed the lead of the lower courts in refusing to infer retroactivity absent an explicitly "expressed intent of Congress."
Arctic Ice Machine Co. v. Armstrong County Trust Co., 192
F. 114, 116 (CCA 3 1911). See also In re Schneider, 203 F.
589, 590 (E.D. Pa. 1913). Iri his opinion for the unanimous
Court, Justice Holmes stated "that the reasonable and usual
interpretation of [bankruptcy] statutes is to confine their effect, so far as it may be, to property rights established after
they were passed." 232 U. S., at 639. See Auffm'ordt v.
Rasin, 102 U. S. 620, 622 (1881).
The government nonetheless contends that bankruptcy
statutes are usually construed to apply to preexisting rights.
This statement is unobjectionable in the context of traditional
contract rights, Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, supra,
186 U. S., at 188, but none of the cases cited by the government extend it to property rights such as those involved
here. Claridge Apartments Co. v. Commissioner, 323 U. S.
141 (1944), involved rights to certain tax benefits, not to
property rights. Dickinson Industrial Site, Inc. v. Cowan,
309 U. S. 382, 383 (1940), dealt with the application of new
procedural rules to a bankruptcy proceeding that was pending when the new statute was enacted. Allowing an appeal
to the Circuit Court rather than the District Court in that
case did not eliminate any property rights. Carpenter v.
Wabash Ry., 309 U. S. 23 (1940), involved a provision giving
personal injury judgments the status of operating expenses
and thus priority over mortgagees in ongoing railroad reorganizations. . Although that statute may have disadvantaged
the mortgagees by reducing the amount of cash available to
pay their notes, it did not affect their property right in the
The transition provisions of the 1910 statute, id., § 14, 36 Stat. at 842,
are, in substance, the same as those of the Act. Pub. L. No. 9&--598, Title
IV, §§402, 403(a), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat 2682,2683.
8
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collateral securing the mortgages. McFaddin v. EvansSnider-SueZ Co., 185 U. S. 505 (1902), considered a curative
statute providing the methods by which valid mortgages
could be created in the Indian Territory. The Legal Tender
Cases, 79 U. S. (12 Wall.) 457, 549-550 (1870), decided only
that debts could be paid in legal tender as defined by Congress at the time of payment without impairing the obligation
of contracts.
Thus the government has not cited, and we have not found,
any authority casting doubt on the principle of statutory construction deducible from Holt and Auffmordt: No bankruptcy law shall be construed to eliminate property rights
which existed before the law was enacted in the absence of an
explicit command from Congress. In light of this principle,
the legislative history of the 1978 Act suggests that Congress
may not have intended that § 522(f) operate to destroy preenactment property rights.
An early version of the Act contained a explicit requirement that all its provisions "shall apply in all cases or proceedings instituted after its effective date, regardless of the
occurrence of any of the operative facts determining legal
rights, duties or liabilities hereunder." H.R. 31, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., § 10-103(a) (1975), reprinted in Bankruptcy Act
Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 before the
Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Right of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), n. 14
app., at 320-321. This provision may or may not have been
deleted directly in response to the comments of witness William Plumb to the effect that retroactive invalidation of liens
may be .an unconstitutional taking. Id., at 206~2067.
Nonetheless, Congress's elimination of an explicit command
'is some evidence that it did not intend to depart from the
usual principle of construction. See Bradley v. Richmond
School Board, 416 U. S. 696, 716, n. 23 (1974) ("We are reluctant to read into the statute the very . . . limitation that Congress eliminated.").

~
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"Accordingly, in the absence of a clear expression of Congress' intent to" apply § 522(f)(2) to property rights established before the enactment date, 9 "we decline to construe
the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to
resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the
guarantees of the" takings clause. N.L.R.B. v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U. S. 490, 507 (1979). 10 The judgment of the Court of Appeals must therefore be
Affirmed

9
Because all of the liens at issue in this case were established before
Congress passed the Act, we have no occasion to consider whether
§ 522(f)(2) should be applied to liens established after Congress passed the
Act, but before it became effective.
10
"When aid to construction of the meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its
use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.' ...
Obviously there is danger that the courts' conclusion as to legislative purpose will be unconsciously influenced by the judges' own views or by factors not considered by the enacting body. A lively appreciation of the danger is the best assurance of escape from its threat but hardly justifies an
acceptance of a literal interpretation dogma which withholds from the
courts available information for reaching a correct conclusion. A few
words of general connotation appearing in the text of statutes should not be
given a wide meaning, contrary to a settled policy, 'excepting as a different
purpose is plainly shown.'" United States v. American Trucking Association, 310 U. S. 534, 543-544 (1940) (footnotes omitted).
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